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What conditions must be satisfied if a group is to count as having a justified belief?
Jennifer Lackey (2016 Phil Review) has recently argued that any adequate account of
group justification must be sensitive (in certain ways) to both the evidence actually
possessed by enough of a group’s operative members as well as the evidence those
members should have possessed. I first draw attention to a range of objections to
Lackey’s specific view of group justification and a range of concrete case intuitions
any plausible view of group justification must explain. I then oﬀer an alternative
view of group justification where the basic idea is that group justification is a matter
of groups responsibly responding to their total evidence. This view both avoids
the problems facing Lackey’s account and also explains the relevant concrete case
intuitions.
1 Introduction
One doesn’t have to look hard to find ascriptions of group belief. We’ve all heard
claims like: “The present administration believes that it’s doing a good job,” or
“The psychology department regards its discipline as among the most important in
the university,” or “It’s the opinion of the board of directors that new leadership is
needed,” or “It’s the view of the subcommittee that the proposed reform would be
disastrous.” Each italicized expression is a way of ascribing a belief to a group, and
just as an individual’s belief can be justified or unjustified so can a group’s belief.
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What does it take for a group to have a justified belief? After arguing against
a range of alternative views, Lackey advises we adopt a view of group justification
that is (in certain ways) sensitive to both the evidence actually possessed by enough
of a group’s operative members1 as well as the evidence those members should have
possessed. The motivation for this later condition stems from cases where a group’s
members have duties to possess certain evidence in virtue of being members of their
group, and the flouting of these duties by the members seems to negatively impact
the group’s justification. Accordingly, Lackey advises we adopt a view of group
justification that is both evidentialist and responsibilist in spirit. Here is Lackey’s
(2016: 381) specific way of doing this:
Group Epistemic Agent Account (GEAA)
A group G justifiedly believes that P iﬀ:
(1) A significant percentage of the operative members of G (a)
justifiedly believe that P, and (b) are such that adding together
the bases of their justified beliefs that P yields a belief set that
is coherent, and
(2) (a) Full disclosure of the evidence relevant to the propo-
sition that P, (b) accompanied by rational deliberation about
that evidence among the members of G (c) in accordance with
their individual and group epistemic normative requirements,
would not (d) result in further evidence that when added to
the bases of G’s members’ beliefs that P, yields a total belief
set that fails to make [it] suﬃciently probable that P.
But here is an alternative:
Evidentialist Responsibilism for Groups (ERG)
A group, G, justifiedly believes that P on the basis of evidence E iﬀ:
(1) E is a suﬃcient reason to believe P, and the total evidence
possessed by enough of the operative members of G does not
include further evidence, E*, such that E and E* together are
not a suﬃcient reason to believe P, and
1The basic idea behind the target concept of an “operative member” is that not all members of
groups seem to have a role in fixing what a group believes or what a group justifiedly believes. The
operative members are just those members that do have such a role (Tuomela 2004: 113; Lackey
2016: 350).
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(2) G is epistemically responsible in believing P on the basis
of E.
I aim to make two distinct contributions in what follows. First, I aim to show that
ERG is at least as theoretically appealing as GEAA in its ability to address the
relevant concrete cases that GEAA was constructed to address. Second, I aim to
show how ERG is more appealing than GEAA due to its ability to avoid a range
of objections facing GEAA. So even if some readers have only a modest degree of
sympathy for the objections I oﬀer against GEAA, the argument Lackey oﬀered on
behalf of GEAA will be undermined to the extent that ERG can do the same work
that GEAA was forged to do.
2 Evidential Constraints on Justified Group Belief
Before introducing problems for GEAA and the alternative view of group justifi-
cation that avoids them, it will help us to first reflect on some of the case-driven
insights that motivated GEAA to begin with. Each case is inspired by Lackey’s
(2016) work, and while she discusses additional cases relevant to the assessment of
alternative views of group justification I do not have the space to discuss all of her
cases here. I’ve selected what I take to be the primary kinds of cases. Moreover,
once the evidentialst-responsibilist alternative to GEAA is explained (section 4)
and shown to address the cases discussed here, it will be clear how the evidentialst-
responsibilist alternative to GEAA can also address the remaining cases discussed
by Lackey.
What criteria ought a theory of justified group belief satisfy? First, it seems like
it should be possible for a group to justifiedly believe P when the members of the
group justifiedly believe P on diﬀerent evidential bases. Take the following example:
Different Evidential Bases. A painting might have been stolen.
It’s known that if it was stolen there are only three possible theifs and
each is named ‘Hank’: Hank1, Hank2, and Hank3. A team of three
detectives are investigating this possible theft: Detective1, Detective2,
and Detective3. Detective1 has evidence E1 that entails (H1) that only
Hank1 stole the painting ; Detective2 has a distinct body of evidence E2
that also entails H1; and Detective3 has a distinct body of evidence E3
that also entails H1. None of the detectives have any counterevidence
to H1 nor does any detective have any evidence that would defeat the
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probative force of any other detective’s evidence. When the detectives
confer with each other they don’t share the details of their evidence, they
simply share the fact that their evidence strongly supports the claim that
(S) someone stole the painting. So the team of detectives believes S.
Plausibly, the team of detectives not only believes S, it also justifiedly believes S.
This is not compromised by the fact that its members have not disclosed all of
their information to each other. While it may seem odd that a group’s members
would arrive at a view about S without disclosing all their relevant evidence, it’s
easy to imagine various pressures that would reasonably prevent them from doing
so: maybe understanding each member’s evidence requires an expertise in an area
the other members lack, maybe sharing their evidence would take more time than
they have given their case load, maybe they’re geographically separated and can
only communicate through very brief messages. While such conditions may prevent
the sharing of evidence, it needn’t prevent them from co-ordinating their collective
belief in S in a way that is responsive to the probative force of their total evidence:
for the evidence each detective has supports H1, and thus also supports S, and they
each believe H1 and S because of their evidence. The lesson to draw from this case
is that:
Lesson#1: It’s possible for a group to justifiedly believe P even if each
member of the group justifiedly believes P on a diﬀerent evidential basis.
This lesson is very widely accepted among social epistemologists who have written
on justified group belief.23
2For example, Schmitt’s (1994) joint acceptance account of justified group belief, Goldman’s
(2014) account, and Lackey’s (2016) group epistemic agency account all entail Lesson#1 and that,
other things being equal, the team of detectives in Diﬀerent Evidential Bases is justified despite not
having shared their evidence. Explaining why each account involves this implication in adequate
detail would take more space than can be permitted here.
3It might seem like one of the upshots/presuppositions of cases like Diﬀerent Evidential Bases is
that groups can possess evidence in virtue of their members possessing it even though it’s false that
all or most of the members possess that evidence. This would refute a kind of summativism about
group possession of evidence. But I don’t see an immediate problem for such summativists here.
For there’s a diﬀerence between evidence E impacting the rationality of one’s belief in P because
one possesses evidence E, and evidence E impacting the rationality of one’s belief in P because
someone else possess evidence E and one stands in an epistemically important relation to that
other person. Testimony is a great example of this. Suppose an expert tells me there is conclusive
evidence that P, and I have no reason to distrust her. I now stand in a testimonial relation to the
expert who possesses that conclusive evidence, and it’s my relation to that expert and her evidence
that impacts the rationality of my attitude towards P. But the evidence doesn’t impact my attitude
because I possess the evidence. The evidence might be from areas of theoretical physics that I
couldn’t possibly understand, and hence I’m not in a position to possess it. This is one way to
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Nevertheless, it’s implausible that every time a group’s members justifiedly be-
lieve P on some basis the group justifiedly believes P. Take for example the following,
Lackey-inspired (2016: 361) case:
Conflicting Evidential Bases. A painting might have been stolen.
It’s known that if it was stolen there are only three possible theifs and
each is named ‘Hank’: Hank1, Hank2, and Hank3. A team of three de-
tectives are investigating this possible theft: Detective1, Detective2, and
Detective3. Detective1 has evidence E1 that strongly supports (H1) that
only Hank1 stole the painting, Detective2 has evidence E2 that strongly
supports (H2) that only Hank2 stole the painting, and Detective3 has evi-
dence E3 that strongly supports (H3) that only Hank3 stole the painting.
While H1, H2, and H3 are mutually incompatible, they each entail (S)
that someone stole the painting. So each detective believes S. But when
the detectives confer with each other they don’t share the details of
their evidence; they simply share the fact that their evidence strongly
supports the claim that S is true: someone really did steal the painting.
So the team of detectives believes S.
But notice that each detective possesses evidence that strongly supports that every
other detective’s evidence is misleading since each detective’s evidence strongly sup-
ports that exactly one (diﬀerent) person stole the painting. That is, Detective1’s
evidence, E1, strongly supports that H1 is true and that H2 and H3 are false; De-
tective2’s evidence, E2, strongly supports that H2 is true and that H1 and H3 are
false; and Detective3’s evidence, E3, strongly supports that H3 is true and that H1
and H2 are false. So the total evidence possessed by the group’s members supports
inconsistent propositions, and the total evidence possessed by the group’s members
think about what’s going on in cases like Diﬀerent Evidential Bases: even if a group cannot be
said to possess the evidence that it’s members possess, the fact that the members possess that
evidence and the fact that the members stand in an epistemically important relation to the group,
ensures that the evidence possessed by its members impacts the rationality of the group’s belief.
In the case of testimony we have a good idea of what that epistemically important relation is: it’s
the testimonial relation (whatever exactly it is). In cases like Diﬀerent Evidential Bases it’s not
plausible to think of this in terms of a testimonial relation since the evidence isn’t shared among the
members. One could argue that it’s a (non-summativist) group possession relation. Alternatively,
one could deny that it’s a possession relation at all. One way of doing this would be to hold that
the relation is something like a bare normative transmission relation, where the normative force of
the evidence possessed by the members gets transmitted to the group even though the possession
relation is itself not transmitted to the group. This final option is one I suspect summativists
would be inclined towards, and it shows a general way in which one could be a summativist about
group evidence possession while still accepting the force of Diﬀerent Evidential Bases.
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fails to support H1, or H2, or H3 and thus fails to support S.4
Nevertheless, each individual detective seems justified in believing S because each
detective has suﬃcient evidence for believing S due to the fact that each detective
has evidence that strongly supports S, and each detective is unaware of the defeating
counterevidence possessed by their colleagues. Thus, one might be tempted to think
that if each individual member justifiedly believes S on the basis of their evidence,
then the group must also justifiedly believe S.
But Lackey (2016) argues that we should resist this judgement. There are a few
reasons for this to be gleaned from her insightful discussion. First, it’s not at all
intuitively obvious that the group of detectives is justified in Conflicting Evidential
Bases. So there’s not a lot of intuitive motivation stemming from our concrete case
intuitions. Second, maintaining that the group of detectives is justified conflicts
with plausible ideas about the nature of epistemic justification. For notice that the
total evidence possessed by the group doesn’t support S because the probative force
of each body of evidence that supports S is undermined by evidence possessed by
some other member. It is counterintuitive that a theory of group justification would
imply that a group could be justified in believing S when the total body of evidence
it is relying on (through its members) doesn’t actually support S. This not simply
counterintuitive, but it also seems to generate an implausible asymmetry between
group and individual justification. For in the individual case, when a subject’s justi-
fied belief is evidence-dependent, one’s belief is justified only if one’s total evidence
supports one’s belief.5 This is important for preserving the intuition that what is
distinctive about epistemic justification is that it is a truth-conducive property. But
if group justification is not constrained by the total evidence its members are relying
on in some way, then the connection to truth for group justification will be so thin
that it’s hard to see how it’s a genuine kind of epistemic justification. Since total
evidence requirements for evidence-based justification are near universally endorsed,
I expect most readers will have sympathy for (if not out-right endorse) the idea that
the detectives in Conflicting Evidential Bases lack a justified belief.
So it’s advisable to reject the idea that the team of detectives have a justified
group belief in Conflicting Evidential Bases, and thus draw the following lesson:
4It is to be understood that as part of this case that no one member’s evidence is more weighty
than any others such that when their total evidence is pooled it provides suﬃcient support for
exactly one hypothesis about the theft.
5I cannot justifiedly believe P on the basis of just some of my evidence, E, that supports P when
I also have further evidence, E*, that defeats that original evidence. Knowing that Tweety is a
bird is great evidence that Tweety flies. But I can’t justifiedly believe Tweety flies if I have further
evidence for thinking that Tweety had her wings cut. The later evidence defeats the former.
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Lesson#2: The evidence possessed some member of a group can defeat
the group’s justification even if the rest of the group’s members do not
possess that evidence.
What the previous case shows is that the evidence actually possessed by the members
of a group places limits on what a group can justifiedly believe even if the group
fails to also possess that evidence.
But Lackey goes further. For she thinks that the evidence relevant to fixing a
group’s justification isn’t limited to their possessed evidence. Rather, the evidence a
group should have possessed also plays a role in determining what a group justifiedly
believes. To appreciate this take the following Lackey-inspired (2016: 372-373) case:
Group Epistemic Obligations
Detectives1-3 spend just ten minutes gathering evidence. They know
that they could easily–i.e. in a short amount of time with minimal
eﬀort–acquire more evidence that, for all they know, could impact the
probative force of their total evidence on whether or not it’s true (S) that
someone stole the painting. In that ten minutes each acquires evidence
that strongly supports S, but had they spent only five more minutes in-
vestigating they would have gained decisive counterevidence that proves
S false (e.g. they would have found that the painting had been tem-
porarily moved by the curator for an upcoming exhibit). But since they
didn’t do any further investigation, each of the detectives believes S is
true and each is correct in thinking that S is supported by the total
evidence they individually possess.
Again, while it’s possible that the group of detectives believe S, it’s implausible that
the group could count as justifiedly believing S given their failure to adequately
investigate whether S is true. For, as Lackey (2016: 373ﬀ) points out, if there is
evidence that one should have had which would have defeated one’s justification if
one possessed it, then one’s justification is defeated.6 Thus:
Lesson#3: Even if a group’s possessed evidence provides suﬃcient sup-
port for believing P, a group can fail to have a justified belief in P if the
members of the group should have possessed further evidence.
To summarize: an adequate theory of justified group belief must explain Lessons#1-
#3 by explaining our intuitive verdicts about the specific cases that gave rise to those
6For further defense of the significance of evidence one should have had see Goldberg (forth-
coming a; forthcoming b).
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lessons. GEAA is one way of accommodating these insights. Due to considerations
of space I will leave it to the reader to see Lackey’s (2016: 379ﬀ) explanation of just
how GEAA accommodates cases like those discussed above. In what follows I oﬀer
an alternative account of group justification that can do the same work as GEAA
relative to the cases discussed above while also avoiding each of GEAA’s problems.
3 Trouble for GEAA
GEAA faces three problems. The first two problems involve under-appreciated cases
where justified group belief diverges from the beliefs of its members. The third
problem concerns the counterfactual condition that GEAA relies on. Each problem
for GEAA generates a new desideratum for an adequate theory of justified group
belief.
Caveat: I believe each of the problems to follow are intuitively well-motivated
and if one’s theory of group belief cannot make sense of these cases, so much the
worse for one’s theory of group belief. Moreover, I’m inclined to think the first two
problems make the most sense on non-summativist views of group belief,7 especially
those that emphasize the role of members’ joint commitment.8 Thus I think these
cases provide a bit of confirmation for versions of non-summativism that are able
to naturally explain the possibility of such cases. I say only “a bit of confirmation”
because I suspect there are modest maneuvers available to those with alternative
views of group belief that can help them make sense of the cases to follow. However,
I must set these questions about the metaphysics of group belief to the side; it is
enough of a task to address questions about the epistemology of group belief.9
3.1 Divergence Problems for GEAA(1)(a): Proper Basing
Let’s start with GEAA(1)(a). This condition tells us that a group can justifiedly
believe P only if the operative members of the group justifiedly believe P.10 Lackey
7...where “non-summativist” views of group belief are broadly taken to be ones that don’t make
a group’s belief in P a simple function from most or all of a group’s relevant members believing P.
8Cf. Gilbert (1987; 1989: 288ﬀ), Gilbert and Pilchman (2014: 195), and Tuomela (1995).
9A referee pointed out to me that even if the cases I discuss below are neutral on views of
group belief, they seem to have implications for views about a group’s possession of evidence.
Specifically, they seem inconsistent with a kind of summativist view of group evidence possession.
I address this issue in footnote 3.
10A referee suggested to me that some may think GEAA is ambiguous between the members
believing P personally and the members believing P in their capacity as members. However, since
personal (=private, individual) belief is the standard sense of belief one conveys when attributing a
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(2016: 342) states that her term ‘justifiedly believes’ refers to group doxastic justifi-
cation, i.e. the justification a group has for a belief they actually hold. The trouble
is that there are intuitive cases where none of a group’s members are doxastically
justified in believing P while the group is doxastically justified in believing P. Such
cases exist because a group can respond to the evidence its members possess in a way
that diﬀers from how each member individually responds to that evidence. Thus,
it’s possible for there to be cases where a group properly responds to the relevant
body of evidence possessed by its members while the members themselves do not
properly respond.
Before outlining one such case, it will be helpful to reflect on Turri’s recent
work on what it takes to have a doxastically justified belief. Consider the following
suﬃcient condition for having a (doxastically) justified belief:
(Basis) If evidence E is S’s source of justification to believe P, and S
believes P on the basis of E, then S has a (doxastically) justified belief
in P.11
While (Basis) has been endorsed by many epistemologists, many have also rejected
it.12 The sorts of cases that have led to its rejection are cases where agents respond
to their evidence in support of believing P, but their way of responding to their
evidence is epistemically problematic. Here’s one case Turri (2010: 315-316) uses to
illustrate the point:
“belief” to an individual, I suspect Lackey would have made it clear if she wanted us to understand
something other than personal belief when she attributes beliefs to individuals. Moreover, many
of Lackey’s counterexamples are understood most naturally as cases where groups have/lack justi-
fication (at least in part) because their members have/lack a justified personal belief. Additionally,
GEAA seems threatened by cases that Lackey herself provides if (1)(a) were understood in terms
of members’ believing P in their capacity as members. For example, take Lackey’s (2016: 351)
Philip Morris case: Ignoring Evidence. In that case it’s intuitive not only to think that Philip
Morris is not justified in not believing (O) that the dangers of smoking give the company a reason
to believe that warning labels should be placed on cigarette boxes, it’s also intuitive to think Philip
Morris also justifiedly believes O. But then Philip Morris has a justified belief in O even though its
members do not believe O in their capacity as members (= the members do not jointly accept O).
But that’s inconsistent with GEAA. So there are a few reasons to prefer the personal belief reading
of (1)(a). (The idea that in Lackey’s Philip Morris case the jury believes O might seem inconsistent
with joint acceptance theories of group belief since the jury’s members don’t jointly accept O. But
there are two ways of being a joint acceptance theorist: holding that joint acceptance by a group’s
members is necessary for group belief, and holding that while it’s suﬃcient for group belief, other
conditions may also be suﬃcient. Only the necessity claim is threatened by the Philip Morris case.
This raises issues concerning the nature of group belief that I cannot hope to adequately delve into
here.)
11See Turri (2010) for discussion of the pedigree of this condition.
12Here are some folks who have rejected it: Armstrong (1973: 98), Swain (1988: 467), Millar




Consider two...jurors, Miss Proper and Miss Improper, sitting in judg-
ment of Mr. Mansour. Each paid close attention throughout the trial.
As a result, each knows the following things:
(P1) Mansour had a motive to kill the victim.
(P2) Mansour had previously threatened to kill the victim.
(P3) Multiple eyewitnesses place Mansour at the crime scene.
(P4) Mansour’s fingerprints were all over the murder weapon.
<Mansour is guilty> is propositionally justified for both jurors because
each knows (P1–P4). As it happens, each comes to believe <Mansour is
guilty> as the result of an episode of explicit, conscious reasoning that
features (P1–P4) essentially. Miss Proper reasons like so:
(Proper Reasoning) (P1–P4) make it overwhelmingly likely
that Mansour is guilty. (P1–P4) are true. Therefore, Mansour
is guilty.
Miss Improper, by contrast, reasons like this:
(Improper Reasoning) The tea leaves say that (P1–P4) make
it overwhelmingly likely that Mansour is guilty. (P1–P4) are
true. Therefore, Mansour is guilty.
... [yet] only Miss Proper’s belief that Mansour is guilty is doxastically
justified.
Many have since followed Turri in taking cases like this to refute (Basis). For it’s
clear that on the usual accounts of the basing relation (as a causal or counterfac-
tual or doxastic relation of some sort) that Miss Improper’s belief can be based
on (P1–P4). So, given that her knowledge of (P1–P4) generates propositional jus-
tification to believe that Mansour is guilty, (Basis) entails that her belief can be
doxastically justified if she bases her belief on her knowledge of (P1-P4). But what
Turri has observed is that Miss Improper’s use of her evidence is, well, improper. She
uses her evidence to form her belief in Mansour’s guilt in a way that is epistemically
inappropriate and cannot yield a doxastically justified belief.
It’s a simple trick to transform the case of Miss Improper into an objection
to GEAA(1)(a). Take a jury in which every juror responds to their evidence as
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Miss Improper does, i.e. every juror arrives at the belief that Mansour is guilty
via Improper Reasoning. Yet every juror also recognizes that as jurors they should
ignore the tea leaves in the sense that tea leaf readings should not figure into their
collective deliberations. For every juror respects the fact that only court presented
evidence should be used in the context of legal deliberations. So when the jury
members deliberate they never once include their private views about the tea leaves
in their discussions nor do they in any other way take the tea leaves into account in
arriving at a collective position on Mansour’s guilt. Rather, when they deliberate
as a group and reach the view that Mansour is guilty they reach it in the same way
that Miss Proper does. Thus, when the jury reports on its belief that Mansour is
guilty the jury explains how they arrived at that belief in the following way:
It is the view of this jury that Mansour guilty. We hold this view be-
cause (P1–P4) make it overwhelmingly likely that Mansour is guilty, and
(P1–P4) are true.
So here we have a case where the group holds a doxastically justified belief because it
properly responds to its evidence, while no member of the group properly responds
to its evidence. So no member of the group is doxastically justified. But this is incon-
sistent with GEAA(1)(a)’s requirement that at least some of the group’s operative
members be doxastically justified. Accordingly, GEAA is unable to accommodate
the thought that group and member doxastic justification can diverge in this case.13
13A referee pointed out to me that some might worry that the fact that the jury’s members only
employ Proper Reasoning when acting in their capacity as jury members, suggests that the jury
members also come to believe Mansour is guilty in response to Proper Reasoning. This would
suggest that the personal beliefs of the jury members then become doxastically justified.
Doubtless it is possible that someone who first started out personally believing in Mansour’s
guilt via Improper Reasoning could subsequently revise how they hold their personal belief upon
considering Proper Reasoning and coming to recognize that it is epistemically adequate reasoning.
But undercutting the objection to GEAA at this point requires that it be impossible for a subject
not to hold a personal belief in response to reasoning that they recognize as epistemically adequate.
Not only is this impossibility claim not clearly right, it’s inconsistent with the idea that part of
what it is for one to hold one’s personal belief in response to some form of reasoning is for that
form of reasoning to (at least partially) cause one to hold/sustain that personal belief. But causal
relations are contingent. In which case it’s false that just because one recognizes an additional
form of reasoning as adequate for holding a personal belief that one will inevitably thereby come
to hold that personal belief in response to that reasoning. So it seems possible for an agent to
first form a personal belief in response to bad reasoning, learn of the good reasoning, and not then
come to maintain their personal belief in response to the good reasoning.
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3.2 Divergence Problems for GEAA(1)(a): Beliefs
GEAA(1)(a) tells us that a group’s beliefs are limited to the beliefs of its operative
members. Thus, if no operative member believes P, then the group does not believe
P either. But there are some cases where it seems plausible that a group justifiedly
believes that P even if no one in the group believes that P. While some cases of
divergence in belief are not all that intuitive,14 some are quite credible. For example:
Hidden Belief Revisions
A corporate board is trying to determine whether P, and so it has jointly
evaluated the evidence for P. After their deliberations every board mem-
ber comes to believe P solely because their total evidence strongly sup-
ports believing P, and every board member publicly expresses this fact
at the board meeting. Because of this each board member comes to
know that every other board member believes P solely on the basis of
their shared evidence, which strongly supports believing P.
So in the board’s attempt to figure out whether P every board member came to
believe P just on the basis of their evidence, and every board member came to know
that every other member believes P. Because of this it is hard to reject the idea that
the board itself believes P. Our story now continues:
... Days later each board member begins to doubt himself/herself. This
rising doubt is owed to the fact that their evidence was very complicated
and diﬃcult to keep in mind all at once without having various graphs
and charts in front of them. So every board member ends up suspend-
ing belief in P rather than trusting their earlier judgement. Despite
this, each member of the board still believes that every other member
of the board continues to believe P–since that was every member’s view
at the end of their deliberations. So when each member is asked what
the board’s view is about P, every member will assert that the view of
the board is that P is true; and when each board member has to draw
inferences when reasoning on behalf of the board they will do so on the
basis of P; and when each member is called upon to act on behalf of the
board every member will act on P. Nevertheless none of the board mem-
bers now believe that P is true for every board member has suspended
belief in P.
14Lackey (2016: 344ﬀ) for example discusses one such case from Schmitt (1994) involving a jury
who is instructed to ignore a bit of evidence E.
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In these circumstances it’s intuitive to think that the board continues to believe P
even though all of the board members have ceased to believe P. Notice how this
judgement fits with familiar observations about the function of belief: belief is a
state that’s crucially connected to assertion, inference, and action. That is, when
one believes that P one’s in a state that, other things being equal, disposes one to
assert that P, draw inferences in a way that presupposes the truth of P, and act on
P.15 Notice that these characteristics are characteristics that the board retains in
the example above. For when operating in their role as a board member each board
member will, other things being equal, assert that P, draw inferences from P, and
act on P. Yet outside of their role as board members they will not assert P, draw
inferences from P, or act on P since they have each suspended belief in P.
Does the board justifiedly believe that P once each member has suspended belief?
Here it is plausible to think that the board does continue to justifiedly believe P. For
it’s not as if the board’s present belief in P is now floating free of its evidence; rather,
it’s the board’s past responsiveness to its total evidence that is responsible for its
present belief. So it’s plausible to think that the board does justifiedly believe P.
But then GEAA has a problem. For GEAA(1)(a) implies that at least some board
members must justifiedly believe P. But none of them do because none of them have
a belief in P.16 So once again GEAA has a problem.17
3.3 Problems for GEAA(2)
Recall GEAA(2) tells us that a group G justifiedly believes P only if:
(2) (a) Full disclosure of the evidence relevant to the proposition that P,
(b) accompanied by rational deliberation about that evidence among the
members of G (c) in accordance with their individual and group epistemic
normative requirements, would not (d) result in further evidence that
when added to the bases of G’s members’ beliefs that P, yields a total
15Wedgwood (2012) and Wesiberg (2016).
16Notice that the claim is not that each member is justified in suspending belief. Indeed, I
suspect a plausible case can be made for some kind of historical reflection principle along the
following lines: other things being equal, if one knows that one’s past self believed P and one’s
past self was more informed than one’s present self, and one has no new relevant information, then
one is rationally required to believe P.
17There are further putative cases in the literature where no member of a group believes P
though the group does believe P (Bird 2014: 57; Gilbert 1989: 288ﬀ; Gilbert and Pilchman 2014:
195). In some of these cases the group at no point in their history ever believed P. These cases
threaten GEAA in the same way. But in conversation with others I’ve found that such cases are
much less compelling than the case described above.
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belief set that fails to make [it] suﬃciently probable that P.
There are two things to notice about this condition. First, it’s just a bit vague on
what counts as an adequate amount of deliberation. For example, some evidence
might only emerge in the course of months or years of deliberation. Is group jus-
tification truly hostage to what evidence would emerge were the group to spend
months or years considering an issue? Perhaps this is sometimes the case. But
there are surely other times where the possibility of acquiring evidence after a very
long period of deliberation is not epistemically relevant to one’s presently having a
justified belief. What about shorter periods of deliberation, e.g. weeks or days or
hours? The concern is that any line one draws in the sand will seem arbitrary. But
perhaps there are contextual factors that can in some principled way draw these
lines. I just want to note that providing some story here is important.
The second thing to notice about condition (2) is that it’s a would-not counter-
factual. So take the relevant conditions from (2):
(a)-(c): Enough of the operative members of group, G, fulfill their epis-
temic duties (qua group and qua individuals) and they fully disclose their
relevant evidence, E, and deliberate over it.
(d): No further evidence, E*, emerges in the course of that deliberation
that makes G’s total evidence, E&E*, for P such that P is not suﬃciently
probable on E&E*.
Given the standard semantics for counterfactual conditionals, (2) is true only if the
space of nearby worlds is such that: if (a)-(c) obtain at a nearby world, then (d)
also obtains at that world.
But notice how demanding this is. Suppose (a)-(c) are satisfied at a nearby
non-actual world, and that at this world enough operative members discover a so-
phisticated line of reasoning that leads to strong evidence, E*, against P. However,
the sophistication of the line of reasoning makes it unlikely that any of them would
discover it–that is, at most of the nearby worlds they don’t discover this line of
reasoning. So suppose the actual world is like this: due to the sophistication of the
line of reasoning no member of the group discovers the counterevidence E* in de-
liberation after each member has disclosed their evidence. Does the fact that there
are some few nearby non-actual worlds where the operative members do discover
the sophisticated line of reasoning that leads to E* really imply that in the actual
world the group fails to justifiedly believe P? The idea that it does will doubtless
strike many as implausible.
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For contrast, consider how implausible this is in the individual’s case. For it
seems possible for an individual to have a justified belief in P on the basis of evidence
E at a time, and have that justified belief overturned so that one comes to justifiedly
believe not-P at some later time only because one’s further a priori reflection on E
surfaces further evidence E* such that E and E* justify not believing P. For example,
suppose a known highly reliable testifier says that evidence E supports believing P,
and having never considered E before I trust her and I believe that E supports
believing P. On standard views of testimonial justification I can then justifiedly
believe that E supports believing P even if E does not actually support believing
P–justification is fallible after all. However, suppose that I find E really interesting
and keep reflecting on it’s relation to P. But after a good deal of a priori reflection
on E and it’s inferential relations to P I realize that the testifier got it wrong: E
does not support believing P. I now justifiedly reject the proposition that E supports
believing P.18
But the idea that I could initially be justified in my belief that E supports P on
the basis of testimony, while I later become justified in not believing that E supports
P due to my reflection on E’s inferential relations to P is at odds with a condition
like GEAA(2) when applied to the individual’s case.19 But if a condition parallel to
GEAA(2) doesn’t hold in the individual’s case, why should GEAA(2) hold in the
group case?
Now it may well be that group and individual epistemology can separate in such
a way that principles that hold in individual epistemology don’t have counterparts
that hold in group epistemology. But GEAA(2) is not clearly one of them. For
suppose I was part of a research team and that I and the other members jointly
came to believe that E supports P solely on the basis of the testimony I initially
recieved. Then suppose that at some time later, due solely to my further reasoning
which yielded further evidence against the idea that E supports P, that group came
to believe that E does not support believing P. In such a case it’s hard to see what
relevant diﬀerence there could be between my individual case and the group case
such that early on I was justified in believing that E supports P on the basis of
testimony, but my group was not justified in believing that E supports P. Again,
it seems like we need something other than GEAA to explain what grounds group
18If one is worried about implicit assumptions that lead to controversial views about peer dis-
agreement, just suppose that the testifier is an epistemic inferior. Epistemic inferiors can still be
valuable sources of information via testimony.
19Given the vagaries of the temporal dimension of GEAA(2), compress my story into whatever
you feel like the right length of deliberation happens to be for GEAA(2) to be a plausible condition.
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justification.
4 Evidentialist Responsibilism for Groups: Expla-
nation
One thing we learned from the previous sections is that group justification has
to be responsive to the evidence possessed by its members even if the members
of the group have not shared that evidence with each other. This is a kind of
evidentialist constraint on group justification. Another thing we learned from the
previous sections is that group justification has to be constrained by epistemically
responsible agency, i.e. members cannot achieve justification for their group on
the cheap by failing to fulfill their relevant epistemic obligations. This is a kind of
responsibilist constraint on group justification.
GEAA is one way of uniting these two constraints, but here is another:
Evidentialist Responsibilism for Groups (ERG)
A group, G, justifiedly believes that P on the basis of evidence E iﬀ:
(1) E is a suﬃcient reason to believe P, and the total evidence
possessed by enough of the operative members of G does not
include further evidence, E*, such that E and E* together are
not a suﬃcient reason to believe P, and
(2) G is epistemically responsible in believing P on the basis
of E.
In the remainder of this section I’ll explain how ERG is to be understood. As I will
note at the end of this section, just how one fills out the details of ERG’s conditions
will depend a bit on one’s further theoretical commitments. Since I cannot here hope
to settle all the collateral issues that a maximally precise filling out of ERG depends
on, I will sketch some directions diﬀerent theorists may be inclined towards. But
even though some aspects of ERG will remain just a bit schematic it will become
clear in the next section that ERG can avoid GEAA’s problems as well as explain
our judgements about the concrete cases of the previous section.
The first thing to notice about ERG is that its scope is limited by its left-hand
side: its concern is only with justified group beliefs that are based on evidential
considerations. Thus ERG leaves open the possibility of a more general account
of group justification that permits some non-evidence-based justified group beliefs.
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After all, if one rejects evidentialism in the case of individual justification (as many
epistemologists do) then one should be at least open to the idea that evidentialism
fails for groups also. I find grappling with evidence-based group justification a
suﬃciently challenging task, so I limit my focus to it.20
Second, according to ERG(1) the total evidence relevant to the justification of
the group’s belief is not all the evidence possessed by every member–at least not in
every case. For some group members will not be operative members, and sometimes
there will be evidence that is not possessed by enough of the operative members for it
to be part of the pool of total evidence relevant to evaluating a group’s justification.
How many, or what percentage, of operative members need to have evidence E in
order for E to be part of that pool of evidence? Like Lackey, I will leave this vague
because settling these questions likely depends on the nature of the group in question
and the specific functions of their operative members. Sometimes it may be enough
that one operative member–perhaps the group’s leader–possesses E for E to be part
of the total relevant evidence. Other times, it might be that more members need to
possess E for E to be part of the total evidence relevant to a group’s justification.
The third thing to note about ERG(1) is that it makes a group’s justification
sensitive to defeaters. For even if a subset of the total evidence, E, provides strong
support for believing P, it may be that the total evidence includes (rebutting, un-
dercutting, or normative) defeating evidence, E*, such that E&E* fail to give one
suﬃcient reason to believe P. In such cases ERG(1) will not be satisfied, and so ERG
will not imply that a group has a justified belief in such cases. It is this feature of
ERG that does the work that GEAA(1)(b) was intended to do. For that condition
was intended to accommodate the insight that a group could justifiedly believe P
only if its members’ evidence supported a coherent set of beliefs. Take the uncon-
troversial assumption that one’s total evidence doesn’t provide one with suﬃcient
reason to believe P if one’s total evidence provides equal support for believing P
and also holding further attitudes that are incoherent with believing P. Given that
assumption, EGR(1) can easily explain the insight that a group could justifiedly
believe P only if the evidential bases of the group’s members support a coherent set
of beliefs that include believing P.21
20As GEAA is formulated it’s unclear whether GEAA is consistent with the possibility of justified
baseless beliefs (cf. Turri 2011; Goldman 2009). For GEAA seems to require that a justified group
belief be based on something. But if it’s possible for there to be justified beliefs that a group’s
members hold that are based on nothing, then GEAA seems to predict that the group cannot itself
justifiedly hold that belief. Due to considerations of space I will not here develop this objection to
GEAA.
21The importance of this is manifested in Lackey’s (2016: 357ﬀ; 382ﬀ) Group Justification
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Now consider ERG(2). The first clarification concerns how we should understand
a group basing a belief on its evidence as opposed to an individual doing so. Our
discussion of concrete cases in section 2 suggests that the following is a plausible
suﬃcient condition for group basing:
Group Basing Condition
A group’s belief in P is based on evidence E at time t1 if: either
(a) at t1 enough of the group’s operative members believe (/are
jointly committed to) P on the basis of E, or
(b) if E = E1&E2&...&En then: at t1 enough operative mem-
bers believe (/are jointly committed to) P on the basis of
some subset of E1-En, and E1-En are each part of the basis of
enough of the operative member’s belief in (/joint commitment
to) P, or
(c) the group believes P at t1 because at some earlier time, t0,
(a) or (b) obtained.
The parenthetical concerning ‘joint commitment’ in (a) and (b) are meant to illus-
trate how the present account of group basing being sketched can be massaged to
fit diﬀerent views of group belief. Simple summativist views (Quinton 1975; Co-
hen 1989) and certain judgement aggregation views (List and Pettit 2011) of group
belief make group belief a function of its operative members’ beliefs. In contrast,
certain non-summativists about group belief reject the idea that group belief is a
function of members’ beliefs. Rather, they hold that a group can believe P even if
few-to-none of its members believe P; what matters for these non-summativists is
that the group’s members stand in some kind of pro-relation (e.g. joint commit-
ment) to P such that the group counts as believing P (Gilbert 1987, 1989; Gilbert
and Pilchman 2014; Bird 2014; Kallestrup forthcoming; Tuomela 1995, 2004). You
can see why, then, it would be odd for such non-summativists about group belief to
endorse a view of group basing that required members to believe P on the basis of
E if a group’s belief is to be based on E. Since I cannot here adjudicate between
diﬀerent views of group belief I invite readers to precisify the Group Basing Con-
dition in a way that suits their theoretical preferences. In this regard, notice that
the Group Basing Condition is only a suﬃcient condition. This is, again, because
Paradox. For considerations of space I’ve omitted discussion of this aspect of Lackey’s paper. But
it should be clear how ERG(1) addresses this concern. See Lackey (2016: 383-385) for a discussion
of the notion of coherence.
18
one’s attitudes towards the metaphysics of group belief will tend to direct one to
further and likely incompatible suﬃcient conditions. But even so, (a)-(c) remain
intuitively plausible and they should be relatively uncontroversial on most views of
group belief. Moreover, they’re all we will need in what follows.
(a) captures the idea that a group can believe P on the basis of E just in virtue
of enough of its members believing P on the basis of E (/enough of its members
being jointly committed to P on the basis of E). (b) captures the thought couched in
Lesson#1: that a group’s belief in P can be based on evidence E (where E includes
just E1-En) even though no member bases their belief (/joint commitment) on all of
E1-En. Rather, it can be enough that each of E1-En is part of the basis of enough
operative member’s belief in (/joint commitment to) P. (c) captures a plausible
tracing condition for group basing. By analogy, take the fact that my belief in the
soundness and completeness of first-order propositional logic is based on the proofs
for these found in standard logic textbooks. But it’s been a while since I’ve thought
about those; embarrassingly, I’ve mostly forgotten them! But I still believe them on
the basis of the proofs in a derivative historical sense: I now believe them because
I once fully understood the proofs and formed a belief on that understanding. So
in this sense my present belief is based on the proofs. (c) expresses the same sort of
thought for group belief.22
How should we understand ERG(2)’s responsibility condition? I propose we
think of it in the following way:
Group Responsibilist Condition
A group, G, is epistemically responsible in believing P on the basis of
E iﬀ (a) enough of the operative members of G satisfy their G-relevant
epistemic duties, and (b) G properly bases its belief on E.
(a)’s idea of a G-relevant epistemic duty has to do with epistemic duties that a
member of G has in virtue of being a member of G with a particular role in G.
Think back to the detectives in Group Epistemic Obligations: in virtue of being a
group of detectives on a case, each with an investigative role, each detective had an
obligation to engage in a certain level of investigation in order to have a justified
belief on the basis of their evidence. It’s not hard to think of additional cases where
one’s membership and role within a group can bring on additional epistemic duties
that one would not have had were they not a part of the group. For example, part
22See Goldman (2009) for defense of this kind of historical condition for justified belief in the
individual’s case.
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of being a faculty philosophy teacher responsible for grading student essays involves
a duty to know the content of those essays; and being a lawyer on a defense team
for a client brings with it a duty to know the particulars of the case. But were one
not a philosophy teacher or a lawyer one would have no obligation what so ever to
know these things. The claim of (a) is just that a group responsibly believes P only
if its members satisfy the epistemic duties they have in virtue of being members of
G with a particular role in G.2324
(b)’s idea of properly basing one’s belief on one’s evidence has to do with what-
ever it is that diﬀerentiates the case of Miss Proper from Miss Improper discussed
above. What that case does for us is highlight the fact that there is some such
diﬀerence; what that case does not do for us is explain what that diﬀerence con-
sists in. Again, the scope and length of this project forces me to leave oﬀ the task
of advocating for any particular view of that diﬀerence.25 However, since we saw
above that it was intuitively plausible that a group could properly base its belief
on evidence E while its members do not, we should expect an adequate theory of
proper basing that is extended to groups to explain the possibility of such cases.26
Doubtless many readers will be discontent with the lack of specificity of cer-
tain aspects of my exposition of ERG, the Group Basing Condition, and the Group
Responsibilist Condition. But this lack of specificity should not be seen as an ob-
23One thing to note about the Group Responsibilist Condition is that it doesn’t matter what
the result would have been had the members fulfilled their epistemic duties. For example, maybe
the group believes P on E but had they fulfilled their epistemic duties they would have acquired
further evidence, E*, such that E&E* do support believing P. In such a case, the group is surely
fortunate that both E and E&E* support believing P. But being so fortunate does not entail being
responsible in the target sense.
24Again, see Lackey (2016) and Goldberg (forthcoming a, forthcoming b) for further discussion
and defense for this generals sort of condition.
25For discussion of possible explanations see Neta (forthcoming), Smithies (2015), and xxxx.
26Here’s an outline of a case worth thinking about in relation to the Group Responsibility
Condition. Suppose a group’s members each believe P on some subset of the group’s total set
of evidence, but it’s only the total set of evidence that adequately supports P. Can the group
justifiedly believe P on E if every member believes P on an inadequate piece of evidence? ERG as
characterized above leaves it as a possibility that such a group has a justified belief. Notice that
this is a lot like the divergence case from section 3.1, and part of what that divergence case teaches
us is that not all of an individual’s epistemic obligations need be satisfied if the group is to have
a justified belief (see footnote 28). While granting a group justification in such a case might seem
odd notice that it doesn’t have the result that group justification floats free of the total evidence
possessed by the operative members. Rather, ERG continues to ground group justification in that
total evidence. This is what makes ERG immune to worries stemming from Lackey’s (2016: 351)
Philip Morris cases where members manipulate the evidence available to the group. What group
justification floats free of according to ERG is the satisfaction of (at least some of) its member’s
individual epistemic obligations that are not also G-relevant obligations. But, should one wish,
one could close oﬀ cases like this by treating the duty base a belief on adequate evidence as both
an individual and a G-relevant obligation. I will leave this an open question for readers to ponder.
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jection. Compare the fact that many epistemologists first become persuaded by
reflection on cases that knowledge requires justified true belief that avoids gettier
cases while nevertheless lacking, or being uncertain about, what the best theory
of justification, belief, and gettier cases happens to be. Just think of the on-going
debates between Lockeans and non-Lockeans about outright belief, internalists and
externalists about justification, safety theorists and sensitivity theorists about what
goes wrong in gettier cases. While these are deep and persistent disagreements, epis-
temologists party to these disagreements still tend to agree that knowledge requires
justified true belief that avoids gettier cases. My point in this paper is that ERG
is a plausible view of group justification and that the Group Basing Condition and
the Group Responsibilist Condition are plausible, if incomplete, ways of filling out
the details in ERG.
5 Evidentialist Responsibilism for Groups: Appli-
cation
As noted above, there are diﬀerent ways diﬀerent theorists may want to fill out
certain details involved in ERG. Despite this we’ve now got a good enough grip on
what kind of view ERG is to see how it can avoid the objections to GEAA from
section 3 and accommodate the insights from the concrete cases discussed in section
2.
First, recall Lesson#1 from Diﬀerent Evidential Bases: it’s possible for a group
to justifiedly believe P even if each member of the group justifiedly believes P
on a diﬀerent evidential basis. ERG together with the Group Basing Condition
oﬀers an explanation of this. For, as discussed in the previous section, the Group
Basing Condition(b) leaves it open that no operative member possesses all the of
the evidence relevant to the justification of the group’s belief. So there can be some
cases where each member justifiedly believes P on a diﬀerent evidential basis because
no member has the same body of evidence.
ERG can also accommodate the specific judgement that the team of detectives in
Diﬀerent Evidential Bases has a justified belief in S for the following reasons. First,
ERG(1) is satisfied in that case because the group of detectives’ total evidence (E1,
E2, and E3) supported believing S, and that total evidence did not include any
further evidence that gave them suﬃcient reason to not believe S. Second, ERG(2)
is satisfied in that case because there was (implicitly) no relevant epistemic duty that
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was flouted by the detectives, and because the group (implicitly) properly based its
belief in S on its evidence.
Second, recall Lesson#2 from Conflicting Evidential Bases: the evidence pos-
sessed some member of a group can defeat the group’s justification even if the rest
of the group’s members do not possess that evidence. Notice that ERG entails
this lesson because ERG(1) imposes the constraint that the group’s justification is
hostage to the total evidence possessed by enough of the group’s operative mem-
bers. Thus even if some operative members have evidence E that normally would
be a suﬃcient reason to believe P, if enough of the other operative members have
evidence E* such that E&E* fail to be a suﬃcient reason to believe P then the group
will not count as justifiedly believing P.
It is this implication of ERG(1) that prevents ERG from having the counterin-
tuitive implication that the team of detectives has a justified belief in Conflicting
Evidential Bases. For in that case the total evidence possessed by the operative
members of the group (which implicitly was all of the detectives) is such that it
fails to give the group suﬃcient reason to believe S–for each member’s evidence
was rebutted by some other member’s evidence. Thus, ERG(1) enables ERG to ex-
plain both Lesson#2 and the intuitive judgement that the group of detectives lacks
justification in Conflicting Evidential Bases.27
Third, recall Lesson#3 from Group Epistemic Obligations: the fact that there
is evidence that neither a group nor it’s members actually possesses can prevent a
group from justifiedly believing P if the members of the group should have possessed
that evidence. ERG(2) and the Group Responsibilist Condition quite clearly enable
ERG to explain this lesson. For ERG(2) limits group justification to groups whose
beliefs are held in an epistemically responsible way, and as that condition was spelled
out with the Group Responsibilist Condition it follows that a group lacks a justified
belief if enough of its operative members should have, but actually fail to, possess
further evidence. Thus, because the detectives in Group Epistemic Obligations failed
to acquire evidence that they should have acquired, it follows that ERG(2) is not
satisfied. Thus ERG issues the intuitive verdict that the team of detectives lacks a
justified group belief in that case.
Fourth, consider the first problem GEAA faced (section 3.1): GEAA prohibited
27The implicit assumption here is that in our toy group involving three detectives where each
are investigative peers within the group, every detective’s evidence figures into the total evidence
relative to which the group is or is not justified. But as noted above, it might not be in every case
that every operative member’s evidence figures into the total evidence relative to which the group
is or is not justified.
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groups from having justified beliefs if all their members failed to properly base their
beliefs on their evidence. But we saw that it was possible for a group to properly
base its belief on its evidence even when its members failed to properly base their
belief on their evidence. So these are cases where, intuitively, the group should have
a justified belief in P while none of their members have a justified belief in P. Notice
that ERG(2) together with the Group Responsibility Condition can explain how
such cases are possible. For according to ERG(1) and (2) it’s possible for a group to
justifiedly believe P so long as the group’s total evidence supports P and the group
responsibly believes P. Recall that part of what it is for a group to responsibly believe
P on evidence E according to the Group Responsibilist Condition is for the group
to properly base its belief in P on E. Thus it follows that groups which responsibly
believe P on the basis of E when their total evidence supports P also justifiedly
believe P on the basis of E. The fact that a group’s members may fail to properly
base their belief in P on E doesn’t compromise this according to ERG. So ERG
allows for cases where groups have justified beliefs even when none of its members
do due to improper basing.28
Fifth, consider the second problem GEAA faced (section 3.2): GEAA prohibited
groups from justifiedly believing P when none of their members believed P. But ERG
does not prohibit this so long as the group responsibly believes what its evidence
supports. Thus, if it’s possible for a group to responsibly believe what its evidence
supports while none of its members presently hold the belief (again see section 3.2
for intuitive motivations for this possibility), then ERG will issue the judgement that
in such cases groups hold a justified belief. Some might worry that ERG cannot
accommodate this because it doesn’t make sense to think of a group basing its belief
on a piece of evidence when none of its members are doing so. But recall condition
(c) of the Group Basing Condition, i.e. the historical condition. According to this,
a group’s belief in P can now be based on evidence E even if none of its members
presently have a belief in P; all that is needed is that the group now believes P
on E because enough of its operative members once based their belief in (/joint
commitment to) P on E. Accordingly, ERG has no trouble accommodating cases
28This explanation for how ERG avoids GEAA’s objection presupposes that the epistemic duties
a group’s members must satisfy in order for the group to responsibly believe P doesn’t include
each member properly basing their belief in P on their evidence. From this it follows that there
are at least some epistemic obligations individuals have (e.g. properly basing their beliefs on their
evidence) that are not duties group members have qua group members. Such duties are ones that
members can fail to satisfy without necessarily jeopardizing their group’s justification. This is
another point at which GEAA and ERG diverge. For GEAA requires agents to fulfill all of their
individual epistemic obligations.
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like Hidden Belief Revisions where it is clear that the corporate board now believes
P on evidence E because the whole board previously based their belief in P on E.
Sixth, consider the third problem GEAA faced (section 3.3). Recall the problem
was that GEAA(2) had diﬃculty accounting for cases where there might be some
few nearby worlds where sophisticated lines of reasoning unearth counterevidence
after a period of deliberation. GEAA is incompatible with groups actually having
justified beliefs if there are non-actual nearby worlds where this counterevidence is
discovered. But this was seen to be too demanding a condition. ERG does not
have this implication. For neither ERG(1) nor ERG(2) makes group justification
as extremely sensitive to the ongoings of nearby non-actual worlds as GEAA did.
This is clear in the case of the evidentialist condition, ERG(1), which only requires
a group’s total actual evidence to support believing P. It may be less clear in the
case of the responsibilist condition, ERG(2). So let me explain.
Notice first that ERG(2)’s responsibility condition is explained in terms of a
group’s members satisfying their G-relevant epistemic duties–see the Group Re-
sponsibility Condition. But an individual can satisfy his or her epistemic duties in
the actual world even if they fail to do so in some non-actual nearby worlds. For
example, if I have a duty to give to charity in the actual world and I do give to
charity in the actual world, then I’ve satisfied that duty in the actual world. The
fact that there are some non-actual nearby worlds where I fail to give to charity
doesn’t entail that I’ve failed to give to charity in the actual world. The same is
intuitively true when it comes to ERG(2)’s proper basing condition. For example,
suppose Miss Improper sometimes reasons on the basis of the tea leaves and some-
times she does not: it just depends on whether or not she has time to consult them.
Suppose, then, that Miss Improper lacked the time to consult the leaves and because
of this she arrived at a belief in Mansour’s guilt in the very same way as Miss Proper
did. Well, if Miss Improper arrived at her belief in the same way Miss Proper did,
then Miss Improper’s belief is properly based on her evidence even though there
are some nearby non-actual worlds (e.g. worlds where Miss Improper does have the
time to consult the tea leaves) where Miss Improper’s belief in Mansour’s guilt is
improperly based. So the satisfaction of ERG(2) doesn’t depend on what happens in
nearby non-actual worlds in the way that GEAA does and thus ERG avoids GEAA’s
problem from section 3.3.
Let’s recap. GEAA and ERG have something in common: they are both views of
group justification that are evidentialist and responsibilist in spirit. Moreover, both
are capable of explaining the intuitive judgements we’re inclined to make about the
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concrete cases from section 2.29 However, GEAA faced a range of problems outlined
in section 3. We’ve just seen that ERG can avoid each of them. On balance, then,
ERG seems like the better view. But even if one remains somewhat unconvinced by
the problems of section 3, the fact that ERG seems able to accommodate the same
range of cases that GEAA was constructed to accommodate makes ERG at least as
plausible a view relative to that range of cases.
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